Julian Reif
(pdf)
Contact Information
5254 South Drexel Avenue #3C
Chicago, IL 60615
Mobile: 202.841.6658
Email: 
Website: www.julianreif.com
Education
University of Chicago, Ph.D. in Economics, June 2012 (expected)
Primary fields: Health, Labor
Secondary field: Industrial Organization
Dissertation committee and references: Derek Neal (chair), Ali Hortacsu, Steven Durlauf, Anup Malani
Vanderbilt University, B.A. in Economics, summa cum laude with honors, May 2004
Overall GPA: 4.0
Fellowships, Honors, and Awards
National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship, 2008-2011
University of Chicago Fellowship, 2007-2012
Humane Studies Fellowship, 2007-2011
Vanderbilt Dean's Select Scholarship, 2000-2004
National AP Scholar, 2000
National Merit Scholar, 2000
Teaching Experience
University of Chicago, Department of Economics
- Intermediate Microeconomics (TA)
- Introduction to Industrial Organization (TA)
- Panel Data Econometrics (TA)
- Theory of Auctions (TA)
- Topics in Wage Determination (TA)
Vanderbilt University, Department of Economics
Professional Activities
Referee: Journal of Political Economy
Conference presentations: Stata Conference Boston 2010
Professional Experience
Bates White, LLC, Senior Consultant, July 2004 – June 2007
Washington, DC
- Executed large data analyses using Stata and C++
- Led a team of consultants in the firm's Environment and Product Liability practice
Additional Information
Computer programming skills
Stata, C++, Matlab, Mathematica
Languages
English (native), French (conversant), Italian (beginner)
Citizenships
United States, Switzerland
Erdös number: 6
Publications
"The Relation Between Variance and Information Rent in Auctions" (with Brett Katzman and Jesse Schwartz), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 28 (2010).
This paper examines the conventional wisdom, expressed in McAfee and McMillan's (1987) widely cited survey paper on auctions, that links increased variance of bidder values to increased information rent. We find that although the conventional wisdom does indeed hold in their (1986) model of a linear contract auction, this relationship is an artifact of that particular model and cannot be generalized. Using Samuelson's (1987) model, which is similar but allows for unobservable costs, we show that increased variance does not always imply increased information rent. Finally, we give the appropriate measure of dispersion (different from variance) that provides the link between the bidder value distribution and information rent.
Research Papers
"Addiction and Social Interactions: Theory and Evidence"
Many activities such as smoking and gambling have long been subject
to government regulation. Congress has also considered passing laws to
encourage healthy eating and some corporations subsidize exercising. Each of
these activities can be addictive and is more enjoyable when done with others.
These features, addiction and social interactions, make regulation potentially
important but difficult to design. This paper develops and estimates the first
model of demand for a good that is both addictive and affected by social
interactions. A key benefit of jointly modeling these two phenomena is that
addiction introduces dynamics that allow the researcher to identify social
interactions under relatively weak assumptions. The model also illustrates
that the type of externalities that arise depends greatly on the
precise manner in which social interactions affect individual utility.
Finally, I apply my proposed identification methodology to data on cigarette
consumption from the National Health Interview Survey and find strong evidence
for the presence of both addiction and social interactions.
Accounting for social interactions together with addiction triples the
estimated effect of anti-smoking laws on consumption
compared to a model that ignores them.
"Endogeneity or Anticipation? Evidence from the Effect of Tort Reform on Physician Supply" (with Anup Malani)
While conducting empirical work, researchers sometimes observe
changes in outcomes before adoption of a new treatment program. The
conventional diagnosis is that treatment is endogenous. Observing changes in
outcomes prior to treatment is also consistent, however, with the anticipation
effects that arise naturally out of many theoretical models. This paper
illustrates the importance of properly distinguishing endogeneity from
anticipation effects by showing that incorrectly equating pre-period trends
with endogeneity can lead to biased estimates. The paper then provides a
framework for comparing the different methods for estimating anticipation
effects and proposes a new set of instrumental variables that can address the
problem that subjects' expectations are unobservable. Finally, this paper
examines a specific set of tort reforms that are unlikely to be endogenous to
physician supply but likely to have been anticipated by physicians. Accounting
for anticipation effects increases the estimated effect of these reforms by a
factor of four compared to a model that equates pre-period changes with endogeneity.
[Under review.]
"Incentives for Reporting Disease Outbreaks" (with Ramanan Laxminarayan and Anup Malani)
[Under review.]
Other Publications
Review of Discover your Inner Economist, by Tyler Cowen. September 2008. Available from www.libertyguide.com.
Letter to the editor, The Economist, 3 February 2007, p. 18.
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