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Julian Reif
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Contact Information

5254 South Drexel Avenue #3C
Chicago, IL 60615
Mobile: 202.841.6658
Email:
Website: www.julianreif.com

Education

University of Chicago, Ph.D. in Economics, June 2012 (expected)
      Primary fields: Health, Labor
      Secondary field: Industrial Organization
      Dissertation committee and references: Derek Neal (chair), Ali Hortacsu, Steven Durlauf, Anup Malani

Vanderbilt University, B.A. in Economics, summa cum laude with honors, May 2004
      Overall GPA: 4.0

Fellowships, Honors, and Awards

National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship, 2008-2011
University of Chicago Fellowship, 2007-2012
Humane Studies Fellowship, 2007-2011
Vanderbilt Dean's Select Scholarship, 2000-2004
National AP Scholar, 2000
National Merit Scholar, 2000

Teaching Experience

University of Chicago, Department of Economics
  • Intermediate Microeconomics (TA)
  • Introduction to Industrial Organization (TA)
  • Panel Data Econometrics (TA)
  • Theory of Auctions (TA)
  • Topics in Wage Determination (TA)
Vanderbilt University, Department of Economics
  • Economic Statistics (TA)

Professional Activities

Referee: Journal of Political Economy
Conference presentations: Stata Conference Boston 2010

Professional Experience

Bates White, LLC, Senior Consultant, July 2004 – June 2007
Washington, DC
  • Executed large data analyses using Stata and C++
  • Led a team of consultants in the firm's Environment and Product Liability practice

Additional Information

Computer programming skills
Stata, C++, Matlab, Mathematica

Languages
English (native), French (conversant), Italian (beginner)

Citizenships
United States, Switzerland

Erdös number: 6

Publications

"The Relation Between Variance and Information Rent in Auctions" (with Brett Katzman and Jesse Schwartz), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 28 (2010).
This paper examines the conventional wisdom, expressed in McAfee and McMillan's (1987) widely cited survey paper on auctions, that links increased variance of bidder values to increased information rent. We find that although the conventional wisdom does indeed hold in their (1986) model of a linear contract auction, this relationship is an artifact of that particular model and cannot be generalized. Using Samuelson's (1987) model, which is similar but allows for unobservable costs, we show that increased variance does not always imply increased information rent. Finally, we give the appropriate measure of dispersion (different from variance) that provides the link between the bidder value distribution and information rent.

Research Papers

"Addiction and Social Interactions: Theory and Evidence"
Many activities such as smoking and gambling have long been subject to government regulation. Congress has also considered passing laws to encourage healthy eating and some corporations subsidize exercising. Each of these activities can be addictive and is more enjoyable when done with others. These features, addiction and social interactions, make regulation potentially important but difficult to design. This paper develops and estimates the first model of demand for a good that is both addictive and affected by social interactions. A key benefit of jointly modeling these two phenomena is that addiction introduces dynamics that allow the researcher to identify social interactions under relatively weak assumptions. The model also illustrates that the type of externalities that arise depends greatly on the precise manner in which social interactions affect individual utility. Finally, I apply my proposed identification methodology to data on cigarette consumption from the National Health Interview Survey and find strong evidence for the presence of both addiction and social interactions. Accounting for social interactions together with addiction triples the estimated effect of anti-smoking laws on consumption compared to a model that ignores them.

"Endogeneity or Anticipation? Evidence from the Effect of Tort Reform on Physician Supply" (with Anup Malani)
While conducting empirical work, researchers sometimes observe changes in outcomes before adoption of a new treatment program. The conventional diagnosis is that treatment is endogenous. Observing changes in outcomes prior to treatment is also consistent, however, with the anticipation effects that arise naturally out of many theoretical models. This paper illustrates the importance of properly distinguishing endogeneity from anticipation effects by showing that incorrectly equating pre-period trends with endogeneity can lead to biased estimates. The paper then provides a framework for comparing the different methods for estimating anticipation effects and proposes a new set of instrumental variables that can address the problem that subjects' expectations are unobservable. Finally, this paper examines a specific set of tort reforms that are unlikely to be endogenous to physician supply but likely to have been anticipated by physicians. Accounting for anticipation effects increases the estimated effect of these reforms by a factor of four compared to a model that equates pre-period changes with endogeneity.

[Under review.]

"Incentives for Reporting Disease Outbreaks" (with Ramanan Laxminarayan and Anup Malani)
[Under review.]

Other Publications

Review of Discover your Inner Economist, by Tyler Cowen. September 2008. Available from www.libertyguide.com.

Letter to the editor, The Economist, 3 February 2007, p. 18.














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